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INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY AFTER
UNITED STATES V. COUNCILMAN
Theodore Y. McDonough ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION
1

Over 169 million Americans use the Internet, with about 92 mil2
lion Americans going online during a typical day. Of these, over 42
million send e-mail, over 9 million send an instant message, and
3
nearly 1 million create a weblog. E-mail, instant messaging, and weblogs are merely a few of the many ways in which individuals commu4
nicate over the Internet. As use of the Internet as a means to communicate continues to grow, the lack of a comprehensive statute
protecting the privacy of Internet communications exposes an everincreasing number of individuals to online privacy threats.
To protect the privacy of their Internet activity, “individuals have
historically relied on common law privacy principles and various
5
pieces of non-comprehensive privacy-related legislation.” One statute frequently cited by those seeking to protect the privacy of their
∗

J.D., 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2001, The Pennsylvania
State University.
1
See Pew Internet & American Life Project, Demographics of Internet Users,
http://www.pewinternet.org/trends.asp (follow “Who’s Online” hyperlink) (last visited May 16, 2007) (containing statistics detailing that seventy percent of people over
age eighteen use the Internet); U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Population by Sex and Five-Year Age Groups for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1,
2005, http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2005/NC-EST2005-01.
xls (presenting population estimates in five-year age groups).
2
Pew Internet & American Life Project, Daily Internet Activities,
http://www.pewinternet.org/trends.asp (follow “Daily Activities” hyperlink) (last visited May 16, 2007).
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., Sharon Housley, E-mail, Instant Messaging, Blogs, RSS, Forums and
Listservs: What's Next?, Oct. 7, 2004, http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2004/
10/07/ email-instant-messaging-blogs-rss-forums-and-listservs-whats-next.
5
Yonatan Lupu, The Wiretap Act and Web Monitoring: A Breakthrough for Privacy
Rights?, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶ 5 (2004), http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue1/v9i1_a03Lupu.pdf.
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Internet communications is the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
6
1968 (“Wiretap Act,” or “the Act”). Amended by the Electronic
7
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), section 2511 of the
Wiretap Act provides a private right of action “against certain inter8
ceptions of electronic communications.” These statutes, however,
were written prior to public adoption of Internet communication,
and their language fails to adequately address concerns regarding the
9
privacy of Internet communications.
As new technologies emerge, new laws must be drafted to spe10
cifically address the technology. Unfortunately, the speed at which
legislation can be enacted cannot match that at which new technologies are introduced. As new means of Internet communication are
introduced, the lack of a statute written specifically to protect the privacy of these communications results in uncertainty about exactly
11
what privacy protections these communications will be afforded.
Furthermore, recent court rulings suggest that current law is inade12
quate to protect the privacy of Internet communications.
This Comment examines cases that addressed the level of privacy
protections given to Internet communications, focusing on a recent
case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that
examined whether an Internet Service Provider (ISP) could intercept
13
its subscribers’ e-mail messages without their knowledge or consent.
Although the court concluded that such an act was a violation of the
14
Wiretap Act, this Comment suggests that the decision will have little
impact in protecting the privacy of Internet communications, in part
because of amendments to the Wiretap Act made by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
6

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000).
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
8
Lupu, supra note 5, ¶ 5.
9
See id. n.9; see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2004) (noting that in 1986, when the ECPA was enacted,
“relatively few people had Internet access; commercial electronic mail services . . .
were emerging, but . . . primarily served the business community.”).
10
See generally Jay Campbell, Protecting the Future: A Strategy for Creating Laws Not
Constrained by Technological Obsolescence, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 533, 539–40 (2005)
(suggesting that current wiretapping laws are ill-suited to protect the privacy of
Internet communications).
11
See id. at 541.
12
See infra Parts II.B.2–3.
13
United States v. Councilman (Councilman II), 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
14
Id. at 79.
7
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Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act).
Part II will introduce the Wiretap Act and relevant amendments that
resulted from the ECPA. Part II will also discuss earlier attempts by
individuals to use the Wiretap Act to protect the privacy of their
Internet communications. Part III will discuss United States v. Coun16
cilman, briefly recounting the case’s history, and focusing on the
court’s en banc decision. Part IV discusses the practical effects the
decision is likely to have in protecting the privacy of Internet communications, ultimately concluding that the decision will have no
substantial impact on Internet communication privacy. Finally, Part
V suggests ways in which Internet communication privacy could be
increased.
In United States v. Councilman, the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit recently considered whether the Wiretap Act’s
17
protections applied to e-mails stored on an ISP’s server. A panel of
the court, in Councilman I, initially construed the Wiretap Act so narrowly that it afforded practically no protection at all to e-mail and
18
other Internet communications. The panel decision prompted outcry and criticism from privacy advocates who saw the decision as eviscerating what little privacy protections existed for Internet communi19
cations. At rehearing en banc, the court, in Councilman II, reversed
the earlier panel decision, and held that e-mails in transient storage
20
were indeed protected under the Wiretap Act.
The en banc decision “restore[d] the law to what most had assumed it meant: unauthorized access to e-mail before it arrives in the
21
customer’s in-box is an interception covered by the Wiretap Act.”
However, this restoration may not be permanent.

15

See infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
418 F.3d 67 (Councilman II)(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc). The earlier panel decision in United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), will be referred to as
Councilman I, and the later en banc decision as Councilman II.
17
Id. at 69–71.
18
United States v. Councilman (Councilman I), 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), rev’d
en banc, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
19
See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S7893–96 (daily ed. July 9, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Leahy). Senator Leahy commented that “[i]f allowed to stand . . . [the panel decision] threaten[ed] to eviscerate Congress’s careful efforts to ensure that privacy is
protected in the modern information age.” Id. at S7893.
20
Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 69, 73.
21
Center for Democracy & Technology, Federal Appeals Court Reaffirms E-Mail Privacy Protections, Policy Post 11.20 (Aug. 17, 2005), available at http://www.cdt.org/
publications/policyposts/2005/20 [hereinafter Center for Democracy & Technology].
16
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II. THE WIRETAP ACT
A. History of the Wiretap Act
Enacted by Congress in 1968, the Wiretap Act was largely a codi22
fication of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Berger v. New York and
23
Katz v. United States. The Wiretap Act was intended to “encourag[e]
the uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among private
24
parties.” Among other things, the Wiretap Act makes it illegal to intercept or conspire to intercept “any wire, oral, or electronic com25
munication.”
As electronic communication technology advanced, the Wiretap
Act was unable to adequately address these technological improve26
ments. Congress amended the Wiretap Act in 1986 to cover “the
latest in electronic communication technology” by enacting the
27
28
ECPA. The ECPA is divided into two parts: the Wiretap Act and
29
the Stored Communications Act. The ECPA “generally extend[ed]
the prohibitions on interception to e-mail and craft[ed] new protections for stored communications and stored records held by third
30
parties.”
Despite its best intentions, Congress could not anticipate ad31
vances in Internet communications when the ECPA was enacted.
“The words ‘Internet,’ ‘World Wide Web,’ and ‘e-commerce’ appear
32
in neither the ECPA nor its legislative history.” Additionally, the
ECPA “seemed particularly focused on the threat posed by police surveillance and [was] intended to . . . specify permissible uses of new
33
technology by law enforcement.” Modern Internet communication
22

388 U.S. 41, 51–53 (1967) (explaining that Fourth Amendment protections
applied to electronic interception of oral communications).
23
389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding that Fourth Amendment protections applied to telephone conversations).
24
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532–53 (2001) (quoting Brief of PetitionerAppellant, United States, at 27).
25
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000).
26
See Mulligan, supra note 9, at 1561–64.
27
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
28
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000).
29
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2000 & Supp. II 2003).
30
Mulligan, supra note 9, at 1564.
31
See Lupu, supra note 5, ¶ 9.
32
Id.
33
Id. Lupu notes that:
[t]he Senate report begins with Justice Brandeis’ famous quote from
Olmstead v. United States . . . : “Ways may some day be developed by
which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
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has made the laws protecting the privacy of communication obsolete
once again, and
[d]espite continuous calls for a definitive legislative stance on the
protection of [Internet communication], Congress has not enacted a comprehensive statute. As a result, [individuals who claim
their Internet communications have been illegally intercepted]
have often relied on broad privacy-related statutes such as the
34
Wiretap Act and the ECPA.

The term “electronic communication” is broadly defined in the
ECPA as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that
35
Although the definition
affects interstate or foreign commerce.”
would seem to include nearly all forms of Internet communication,
courts have found that the technical nature of these communications
often precludes the extension of Wiretap Act protections to the
36
Internet.
B. Use of the Wiretap Act to Protect Internet Communication Privacy
Since the enactment of the ECPA and its consequential amendment to the Wiretap Act, relatively few courts have interpreted the
statute’s definition of “intercept.” The ECPA has been described as
37
“fraught with trip wires,” and “famous (if not infamous) for its lack
38
of clarity.” The definitions adopted by courts having had an opportunity to interpret this term suggest that these characterizations are
accurate.
1.

Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service

39

More than a decade ago, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit considered whether e-mails in electronic storage

can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. . . . Can it be that
the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?”
Id. at ¶ 9 n.22 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986) (citing Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928))).
34
Id. ¶ 7.
35
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000).
36
See infra Part II.B.
37
Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1543 (5th Cir. 1994).
38
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994).
39
36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
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could be intercepted within the meaning of the Wiretap Act.
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, the court considered

40

In

whether the seizure of a computer, used to operate an electronic
bulletin board system, and containing private electronic mail
which had been sent to (stored on) the bulletin board, but not
read (retrieved) by the intended recipients, constitute[d] an
unlawful intercept under the Federal Wiretap Act as amended by
41
[the ECPA].

In concluding that the Wiretap Act had not been violated, the court
focused on the distinction between the definitions of “wire commu42
nication” and “electronic communication” as set forth in the Act.
Steve Jackson Games, Inc., published books, magazines, games,
43
and related products.
The company also operated an electronic
bulletin board service (BBS), where it “post[ed] information about its
44
The BBS also allowed cusbusiness, games, [and] publications.”
45
tomers “to send and receive private e-mail.” Until customers read
46
their mail, it was temporarily stored on the hard drive of the BBS.
During the course of an investigation into the unauthorized distribution of a text file containing information on Bell South’s emergency call system, the Secret Service seized a computer used to oper47
ate the BBS.
Secret Service employees later read and deleted
48
unread e-mails stored on the BBS. However, the court found that
the e-mails were not protected electronic communications and the
Secret Service, therefore, did not violate the Wiretap Act by reading
49
and deleting them. The court stated:
The E-mail in issue was in “electronic storage”. Congress’ use of
the word “transfer” in the definition of “electronic communication”, and its omission in that definition of the phrase “any electronic storage of such communication” (part of the definition of
“wire communication”) reflects that Congress did not intend for

40

Id.
Id. at 458 (internal citations omitted).
42
Id. at 461–62.
43
Id. at 458 (citation omitted).
44
Id.
45
Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 458.
46
Id.
47
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432, 435 (W.D. Tex
1993).
48
Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 459.
49
Id. at 461–62.
41
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“intercept” to apply to “electronic communications” when those
50
communications are in “electronic storage”.

This early decision made clear that certain forms of Internet communication might not be protected under the Wiretap Act.
2.

Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines

51

In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether an employer’s unauthorized viewing of an employee’s private, password-protected website was
52
an “interception” in violation of the Wiretap Act.
The court
adopted a narrow definition of “intercept,” and held that, because it
was in electronic storage, the website was not “intercepted” and there
53
was no violation of the Wiretap Act.
Konop, a pilot for Hawaiian Airlines, operated a website on
which he “posted bulletins critical of his employer . . . and the in54
cumbent union.” By requiring visitors to the site to create a user
name and password, Konop controlled access to the site and created
55
a list of individuals eligible to access the site. A member of his employer’s management team, a class explicitly prohibited from viewing
the site by the site’s terms and conditions, accessed the site by using
the user names and passwords of two authorized users (with their
56
permission). The court held that “for a website . . . to be ‘intercepted’ in violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during
57
transmission, not while it is in electronic storage.” Finding Konop’s
website to be a stored electronic communication, the court concluded that the unauthorized access was not a violation of the Wire58
tap Act. The court’s reasoning suggests that current law is ill-suited
to meaningfully protect the privacy of Internet communications.
3.

United States v. Steiger

59

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
also adopted a narrow interpretation of the Wiretap Act based on the

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id.
302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 872–74.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 872.
Id.
Id. at 873.
Konop, 302 F.3d at 878.
Id.
318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003).
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reasoning of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. In United States v. Steiger,
the court noted that “very few seizures of electronic communications
60
from computers will constitute ‘interceptions.’” The court quoted a
scholarly work whose author identified a single circumstance when email may be intercepted:
There is only a narrow window during which an E-mail interception may occur—the seconds or mili-seconds [sic] before which a
newly composed message is saved to any temporary location following a send command. Therefore, unless some type of automatic routing software is used (for example, a duplicate of all of
an employee’s messages are automatically sent to the employee’s
boss), interception of E-mail within the prohibition of [the Wire61
tap Act] is virtually impossible.

Whether under even these circumstances the Wiretap Act would be
found to protect e-mail communications is an issue strikingly similar
62
to the facts presented in a recent First Circuit case.
III.

UNITED STATES V. COUNCILMAN
63

In United States v. Councilman, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether the Wiretap Act applied to e-mail communications in temporary storage on the server of
64
an e-mail service provider. Bradford Councilman was a vice president of Interloc, an online literary clearinghouse that provided lists
65
of rare and out-of-print books. Interloc provided its customers with
66
an e-mail address and was also the service provider. The indictment
alleged that Councilman instructed Interloc employees to write a
computer program that would intercept all incoming e-mails to Interloc customers from Amazon.com and forward a copy to a mailbox
60

Id. at 1050.
Id. (quoting Jarrod J. White, Commentary, E-mail@Work.com: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1997)) (second brackets in original).
62
Although the technological issues in United States v. Councilman are similar to
those in Steve Jackson Games, Inc., Konop, and Steiger, it should be noted that the conduct complained of in the latter three cases was carried out using employers’ resources and fell within the scope of the employment relationship, thereby potentially
exposing the employers to liability. This likely influenced the courts’ reasoning in
those cases.
63
United States v. Councilman (Councilman II), 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en
banc).
64
Id. at 67. The Wiretap Act was amended in relevant respects in 2001, whereas
Councilman’s alleged conduct occurred in 1998. Therefore, all cites to statutes in
the court’s opinion are to those in effect in 1998.
65
Id. at 70.
66
Id.
61

MCDONOUGH_FINAL_V2

2007]

10/17/2007 11:55:31 AM

COMMENT

1059

67

that Councilman could access. Councilman routinely read these e68
mails to gain a commercial advantage.
Councilman contended that his conduct did not violate the
69
Wiretap Act and moved to dismiss the indictment. Because the e70
mails were in “electronic storage” when copied, Councilman ar71
gued, they could not be “intercepted” as a matter of law. Initially,
72
the district court denied Councilman’s motion to dismiss, but reconsidered its decision in light of Konop, which at that time had been
73
recently decided. The district court found that, at the moment they
were copied, the e-mails were in “electronic storage” and therefore
not subject to the Wiretap Act’s prohibition on interception. The
court agreed with Councilman’s position and accordingly dismissed
74
one count of the two-count indictment.
On appeal, a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed,
concluding “that, because the definition of ‘wire communication’ includes ‘electronic storage’ but the definition of ‘electronic communication’ does not, the Wiretap Act’s prohibition on ‘intercept[ion]’
does not apply to messages that are, even briefly, in ‘electronic stor75
age.’” In his dissent Judge Lipez warned that the “line that we draw
in this case will have far-reaching effects on personal privacy and se76
curity.” The full court later granted the government’s petition for
77
rehearing en banc.
At the en banc rehearing, the Councilman II court stated that
78
Councilman’s argument raised questions of statutory construction
and began its analysis by introducing the history and scope of the

67

Id.
Id.
69
Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 71.
70
“Electronic storage” is defined as “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of
a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof;
and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service
for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)
(1994).
71
Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 71.
72
United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 320 (D. Mass. 2003).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 321.
75
Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 71 (citing United States v. Councilman (Councilman
I), 373 F.3d 197, 200–04 (1st Cir. 2004)).
76
Councilman I, 373 F.3d at 208 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
77
United States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (granting rehearing en banc, withdrawing the panel opinion, and vacating the judgment).
As discussed infra, the full court of appeals later reversed the panel decision.
78
Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 69.
68
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79

Wiretap Act. The court then proceeded to address the arguments
by discussing the Wiretap Act’s text, structure, and legislative his80
tory.
First addressing the term “electronic communication,” the court
initially noted that the term’s statutory definition appeared broad
enough to include e-mail messages processed by a mail transfer agent
81
(MTA). The Act defines “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects com82
merce, but does not include – (A) any wire or oral communication.”
Councilman argued that, when read together with the Act’s definition of “wire communication,” the scope of the definition of “electronic communication” would be limited by what the former includes
83
but the latter does not. The Act defined “wire communication” as:
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire,
cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and
the point of reception . . . furnished or operated by any person
engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications or communications
affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any
84
electronic storage of such communication.

Because the definition of “wire communication” included the phrase
“and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication,” while the definition of “electronic communication” did not,
Councilman argued that “Congress intended wire communications,
85
but not electronic communications, to include electronic storage.”
The court also noted that the Act’s definition of “electronic storage”
included “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
86
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof.”
Councilman based his inference on a canon of construction—
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing
excludes all others)—and suggested that “where Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 73.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(A) (1994).
Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 73.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 73.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1994)).
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section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
87
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
Addressing whether Councilman’s inference was justified, the court
88
presented circumstances in which use of the canon is appropriate.
Because the sections’ “language, structure, or circumstances of en89
actment” differed, the court determined that the canon’s application did not resolve the issue of whether electronic communications
90
included electronic storage.
Turning to the Act’s legislative history, the court discussed the
changes to the Wiretap Act that resulted from the passage of the
91
ECPA.
At issue was the ECPA’s amendment of the definition of
“wire communication,” to which the language “and such term in92
cludes any electronic storage of such communication” was added.
Based on the ECPA’s legislative history, the court concluded that the
electronic storage clause was added to the definition of “wire communication” for the sole purpose of regulating access to voice mail,
not to remove electronic communications in temporary storage from
93
the purview of the Wiretap Act.
The court of appeals concluded that neither the text of the
Wiretap Act nor its legislative history supported Councilman’s argument that there was a distinction between e-mails “in transit” and “in
94
storage.” But while the Councilman II court’s opinion extends the
protections of the Wiretap Act to e-mail messages prior to their arrival on the computer of the e-mail service provider, its limited scope

87
Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 73 (quoting the Supreme Court’s explanation of the
canon in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
88
Id. at 74–75. The court stated that the expressio unius maxim is “most apt when
Congress enacts a new, self-contained statute, and two provisions of that act, drafted
with parallel language, differ in that one provision uses a term, but the other provision, where it would be equally sensible to use that term if Congress desired it to apply, conspicuously omits it.” Id. at 74.
89
Id. at 74.
90
Id. at 76.
91
Id. at 76–77. The ECPA was first introduced in 1985. After the Department of
Justice expressed concern that e-mail would be given too much protection under the
original ECPA, a new version that met some of the concerns was introduced the following year. Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 77.
92
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1982), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp. IV 1986)
(The 1986 amendments to the definition of “wire communication” added the electronic storage clause, “and such term includes any electronic storage of such communication.”).
93
Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 78–79.
94
Id. at 79.
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does little to resolve larger privacy questions concerning Internet
95
communications.
IV.

COUNCILMAN’S EFFECT ON THE PRIVACY OF INTERNET
COMMUNICATIONS

Essentially, the First Circuit’s en banc decision does little more
than “restore[] the law to what most had assumed it meant: unauthorized access to e-mail before it arrives in the customer’s in-box is
96
an interception covered by the Wiretap Act.” Moreover, this perceived restoration may not be long-lived.
A. Spyware, Spam, and E-mail as a “Stored Communication”
All major webmail services automatically scan incoming e-mail
messages for viruses and spam. The overwhelming majority of webmail subscribers likely understand the need for this practice, and this
Comment does not suggest that the practice be discontinued. However, without an exception in the Wiretap Act for such a practice,
Councilman II would seem to make this practice illegal. Recognizing
the need for these scans, the Wiretap Act contains an exception for
providers of electronic communication services.
Section
2511(2)(a)(i) allows “provider[s] of wire or electronic communication service . . . to intercept . . . [wire or electronic] communication[s] . . . [when necessary] . . . to the rendition of . . . service or to
the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that ser97
vice.” Scanning e-mails for viruses and spam undoubtedly falls under this exception.
However, the Councilman II decision does nothing to close the
loophole in the Stored Communications Act that allows ISPs to read
and use e-mails after they have reached the recipient’s inbox. After
an e-mail is delivered to a subscriber’s inbox, it ceases to be an “electronic communication” protected by the Wiretap Act, and instead becomes a “stored electronic communication” afforded the lesser pro98
tections of the Stored Communications Act. The provider of an email service may, without restriction, read and use, but not disclose,
99
the contents of any stored e-mail. Whether an e-mail ceases to be an
electronic communication “in transit” at a point earlier than when ac95

See, e.g., Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 21.
Id.
97
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000).
98
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1222–23 (2004).
99
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2702 (2000).
96
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tually read by its intended recipient is an issue that the courts have
yet to address.
Most major ISPs expressly disavow reading their subscribers’ e100
mails. Nevertheless, “the gap in the law should be closed to reflect
101
As was suggested by the Center for Democracy and
the norm.”
Technology, “ISPs should only be allowed to read and use their customers’ e-mail when necessary to protect the ISPs’ rights or enforce
the terms or service, or with prior informed consent, which is the rule
102
that has always been applicable to voice communications.”
103
Additionally, the USA PATRIOT Act might have a substantial
impact on the effect of Councilman II. Section 209 of the act
amended the definition of wire communication by removing the language “and such term includes any electronic storage of such com104
munication.”
Although this amendment was intended to remove
voice mail from the protection of the Wiretap Act, it also weakens
perhaps the most logical argument in support of extending Wiretap
Act protections to e-mail in transit. Specifically, if voice mail were afforded the protections of the Wiretap Act, it would be illogical to
treat e-mail in transit disparately.
Although courts have not yet specifically addressed section 209’s
effect on the interception of e-mail messages in transit, the Konop
opinion is helpful in evaluating the amendment’s potential consequences. In Konop, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit noted that “[b]y eliminating storage from the definition of
wire communication, Congress essentially reinstated the pre-ECPA
definition of ‘intercept’—acquisition contemporaneous with trans105
Furthermore, the
mission—with respect to wire communications.”
court suggested that when the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, “Con-

100
See, e.g., Gmail Terms of Use, http://gmail.google.com/gmail/help/terms_of_
use.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2007) (Section 8 states that “[n]o human will read the
content of your e-mail . . . without your consent”); see also Saul Hansell, You’ve Got
Mail (and Court Says Others Can Read It), N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at C1.
101
Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 21.
102
Id.
103
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42,
49, and 50 U.S.C.).
104
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000) (defining the term wire communication to
include “electronic storage of such communication”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)
(Supp. I 2001) (defining the term wire communication, from which the clause “and
such term includes any electronic storage of such communication” has been deleted).
105
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002).
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gress . . . was aware of the narrow definition courts had given the
106
term ‘intercept’ with respect to electronic communications” and by
choosing not to modify that definition, “Congress . . . accepted and
implicitly approved the judicial definition of ‘intercept’ as acquisition
107
If correct, this reasoning
contemporaneous with transmission.”
suggests that an ISP may intercept e-mail messages en route from
sender to recipient, while those messages are in transient storage,
without a violation of the Wiretap Act.
B. Gmail
Shortly after Google’s April 1, 2004, announcement of its release
of Gmail, the service was criticized by privacy groups as breaching
108
wiretapping laws and exposing users to increased threats to privacy.
Two aspects of Gmail are of particular concern, but on only one
109
Specifically,
might Councilman II have a significant impact.
Google’s use of Adsense technology, which scans messages in order to
deliver targeted advertisements and related information, may, after
110
Councilman II, be an “interception” in violation of the Wiretap Act.
Gmail uses Adsense, the same program that places text advertisements on Google search result pages, to scan e-mails upon viewing
and deliver targeted advertisements based on the content of the e111
This advertising subsidizes the cost of the service, and many
mail.
112
users are willing to accept this practice in return for free service.

106

Id.
Id.
108
See, e.g., Hansell, supra note 100, at C1; Press Release, Thirty-one Privacy and
Civil Liberties Organizations Urge Google to Suspend Gmail (Apr. 19, 2004), available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GmailLetter.htm (urging suspension of
Gmail service until privacy issues are adequately addressed).
109
The second aspect of concern is Gmail’s 2.5-gigabyte storage capacity, which
allows the average subscriber to store e-mails indefinitely, as storage space is no
longer an issue. Thorough discussion of this concern, however, is beyond the scope
of this Comment, as it has little to do with the Councilman II decision and existed before Gmail’s introduction. For an analysis and discussion of the concerns associated
with Gmail’s storage capacity, see Brad Templeton, Privacy Subtleties of GMail,
http://www.templetons.com/brad/gmail.html (last visited May 18, 2007).
110
See About Gmail, http://gmail.google.com/gmail/help/about_privacy.html
(last visited May 18, 2007).
111
See About Gmail: Are There Ads in Gmail?, http://mail.google.com/mail/
help/about.html (last visited May 18, 2007); What’s Adsense, http://www.google
.com/services/adsense_tour/index.html (last visited May 18, 2007).
112
Google has declined to report exactly how many subscribers Gmail currently
has, revealing “only that there [are] millions.” Laurie J. Flynn, Google Links Chat and
Mail Services, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 8, 2006, at 16.
107
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However, after Councilman II, this practice may be in violation of the
Wiretap Act.
As discussed above, scanning e-mail for spam is undoubtedly a
113
“necessary incident to the rendition of . . . [e-mail] service,” and
service providers may properly intercept e-mail messages for those
purposes. Additionally, there are few technical differences between
114
scanning for spam and scanning to deliver targeted advertisements.
But courts have yet to decide whether scanning to deliver targeted
advertisements can be considered a “necessary incident to the rendi115
tion of . . . [e-mail] service.”
While subscribers to Gmail consent to have their e-mails scanned
as part of the service’s terms of use, those who send e-mail to Gmail
accounts have not done so, and those e-mails are being scanned as
116
well. It is this scanning of e-mail from non-consenting persons that
is of particular concern.
Whether Wiretap Act protections apply to e-mails from nonconsenting correspondents will likely depend, in part, on when an email ceases to be an electronic communication “in transit,” and in117
stead becomes a “stored electronic communication.”
“Clearly, an
118
But
opened . . . e-mail is no longer covered by the Wiretap Act.”
whether the act of logging onto an e-mail service provider’s website
without reading new e-mails is enough to move these communications out from under Wiretap Act protections is an issue yet to be decided. The earlier e-mails are no longer considered to be “in transit”
and are instead considered “stored electronic communications,” the
fewer privacy protections they will be afforded.
113

18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000).
See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Council, Gmail Privacy Page, http://
www.epic.org/privacy/gmail/faq.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2005) (Section 2.4 states
that “[f]rom a technical standpoint, there is no categorical difference between
Google ‘content extraction’ and spam filtering – each involves an automated process
that analyzes the body and/or header information of e-mail messages.”).
115
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
116
See Gmail Terms of Use, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/terms_
of_use.html (last visited May 18, 2007); see also Gmail Privacy Policy, http://gmail.
google.com/mail/help/privacy.html (last visited May 18, 2007) (describing Google’s
practice of “maintain[ing] and process[ing] your Gmail account and its contents to
provide . . . relevant advertising”). A subscriber’s Gmail account contents could certainly include e-mails from non-Gmail accounts. Id.
117
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (prohibiting interception of electronic communications in transit), with 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (prohibiting unauthorized access to wire
and electronic communications in electronic storage), and United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that stored electronic communications are not protected by the Wiretap Act).
118
Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 21.
114
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If unopened e-mails are considered “stored electronic communications” when a subscriber logs onto a service provider’s website,
then Google’s use of Adsense will probably not violate any Wiretap
119
Act prohibitions.
If, however, e-mails must be opened (i.e., read)
to become “stored electronic communications,” it may be argued that
Gmail scans are an interception in violation of the Wiretap Act.
Again, it should be noted that individuals sending e-mail from
their Gmail account have consented to having their e-mails
120
scanned.
But replies to these e-mails, and e-mails sent from nonGmail accounts, are composed by individuals who have not consented
121
Moreover, a non-Gmail user may
to having their e-mails scanned.
not be aware that his addressee is using Gmail; many Gmail subscrib122
ers forward e-mails from other accounts to their Gmail account.
Some commentators suggest that Gmail has been unfairly tar123
geted by privacy advocates and legislators.
However fair or unfair
this criticism, Gmail offers numerous benefits that have not been
matched by its competitors, and Gmail subscribers number in the
124
Whether or not Gmail intercepts electronic communicamillions.
tions in violation of the Wiretap Act will depend in part on the reasoning adopted by courts considering the question. Courts adopting
the First Circuit interpretation of the Wiretap Act are more likely to
find that scanning e-mail from non-consenting users with the purpose
of delivering targeted advertising is a prohibited interception under
the Act, while courts adopting the narrow Fifth Circuit definition of
125
“intercept” would likely not find such a violation.

119

Assuming unopened e-mails are indeed “stored electronic communications,”
one author has suggested that the Stored Communications Act be amended to allow
interception of e-mail by the service provider only when doing so does not monetarily benefit the service provider. Jason Isaac Miller, “Don’t Be Evil”: Gmail’s Relevant
Text Advertisements Violate Google’s Own Motto and Your E-mail Privacy Rights, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1607, 1640 (2005).
120
See id.
121
See id.
122
See, e.g., id. at 1609 (noting that “[e]-mail forwarding has become a widely used
practice due to the number of individuals who maintain multiple e-mail accounts”).
123
See, e.g., Grant Yang, Stop the Abuse of Gmail!, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, 34–
36 (2005) (suggesting that Gmail’s practices are consistent with those of its competitors and with industry standards).
124
See Flynn, supra note 112, at 16.
125
See supra Parts II.B and III.
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C. Voice over Internet Protocol
A related privacy issue is emerging with consumer use of Voice
126
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) set to grow rapidly. Essentially, VoIP
127
enables individuals to use the Internet to make telephone calls. Al128
though a decade old, adoption of VoIP had been hampered be129
cause it requires broadband Internet to operate properly. With the
increasing adoption by consumers of broadband Internet access,
which includes cable modems and digital subscriber lines, use of
130
According to a recent survey reVoIP is expected to grow rapidly.
leased by Nielsen/NetRatings, broadband use by Americans increased sixteen percent from January 2005 to August 2005, and the
number of Americans with broadband access is now over 120 million,
131
Furthermore, this
or forty-two percent of the U.S. population.
trend is likely to continue as providers lower the cost for broad132
band.
In the United States, cable VoIP subscribers grew from
911,000 in March 2005 to 1.38 million by the end of June 2005, and
analysts predict that there will be approximately four million VoIP
133
That number is expected to insubscribers by the end of 2005.
134
In addition
crease to over seventeen million in the next few years.
to lower cost as compared with traditional phone service, use of VoIP
carries with it the possibility of attaching documents, video, and other
135
data to a phone call.
Traditional telephone systems connect calls using a system
136
known as circuit switching. When a call is made, this method main126

See Jon Van, VoIP Moves Beyond Blip Stage; Site Reviews Providers, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
6, 2006, at 6.
127
See id.
128
Intertangent Technology Directory, History of VoIP, http://www.intertangent
.com/023346/Articles_and_News/1413.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2005).
129
See Paul Taylor, Mark Odell & Michiyo Nakamoto, Why VoIP Telephony Is Quickly
Coming of Age, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, available at www.westlaw.com, 2005 WLNR
14151006.
130
Id.
131
Press Release, Nielsen/NetRatings, Two Out of Every Five Americans Have
Broadband Access at Home (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.netratings.com/
pr/pr_050928.pdf.
132
Id.
133
Taylor, supra note 129.
134
Id.
135
See, e.g., Owen D. Kurtin & Arthur S. Katz, Has Internet-Based Phone Calling Outpaced the Law?: A Hands-Off Regulatory Approach Fostered VoIP, but Its Competitors Are
Highly Regulated. What Should Be Done?, 27 LEGAL TIMES 45 (describing as “revolutionary” the possibilities associated with VoIP).
136
VoIP: Circuit Switching and Packet Switching, http://computer.howstuffworks
.com/ip-telephony2.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
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tains a connection, known as a circuit, between the parties for as long
137
as they both remain on the line. While dependable, this method is
inefficient because much of the data transmitted during a telephone
138
call is wasted. In contrast, VoIP technology utilizes a more efficient
139
While circuit
method to transmit data, known as packet switching.
switching maintains a constant connection, packet switching opens a
connection just long enough to send a small amount of data, known
140
as a packet, from one computer to another. The data transmission
is similar to that of e-mails, with individual data packets sent along the
least congested route before being reassembled at their destina141
tion.
However, the same technological aspects of VoIP that make it efficient also raise significant concerns about the privacy of these communications, an issue that neither the courts nor Congress have yet
addressed. Although a complete discussion of the legal issues related
to VoIP is beyond the scope of this Comment, one important privacyrelated issue is worth noting.
It would appear that VoIP communications could reasonably be
classified as either a “wire communication,” like a traditional telephone call, or as an “electronic communication” under the Wiretap
142
The technical aspects of VoIP make the transmission seem
Act.
similar in many respects to the transmission of e-mail and other “elec143
tronic communication[s].”
Furthermore, the Act’s definition of
144
“electronic communication” includes “any transfer of . . . sounds.”
However, it seems more likely that courts will, at least initially, classify
VoIP communications as “wire communications” for two reasons.
First, despite its technical aspects, a VoIP communication remains an
145
“aural transfer,” and remains, in essence, a telephone call. Second,
the House report concerning the ECPA made Congress’s intentions
clear when it stated that “[a]s a rule, a communication is an electronic communication if it . . . [cannot] fairly be characterized as one

137

Id.
Id
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
143
Compare VoIP: Circuit Switching and Packet Switching, supra note 136 (explaining the difference between traditional telephone systems and the VoIP system), with
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000) (defining “electronic communication”).
144
§ 2510(12).
145
See § 2510(1).
138

MCDONOUGH_FINAL_V2

2007]

10/17/2007 11:55:31 AM

COMMENT

1069

146

containing the human voice.”
Thus, it seems that the most logical
classification for VoIP would be as a “wire communication,” providing
the same level of privacy protections that traditional telephone calls
enjoy.
Assuming that courts do find VoIP to be a “wire communication,” the USA PATRIOT Act’s amendment to the definition of “wire
147
communication” again becomes troubling.
The amendment supports the argument that while VoIP communications in transit are
covered by the Wiretap Act, VoIP communications in storage, including the transient storage associated with the transfer of these communications, are afforded only the less robust protections of the
Stored Communications Act.
V. STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE THE PRIVACY OF INTERNET
COMMUNICATION
Existing law is ill-suited to protect many forms of Internet-based
communication. Written at a time when recent technological advances and widespread use of the Internet as a means to communi148
cate could not have been foreseen, portions of the Wiretap Act are
now obsolete and inadequate to protect the privacy of Internet communication. As the district court in the Councilman decision observed, “technology has, to some extent, overtaken language. Traveling the Internet, electronic communications are often—and perhaps
constantly—both ‘in transit’ and ‘in storage’ simultaneously, a lin149
The distinction between
guistic but not a technological paradox.”
communications “in transit” and communications “in storage” is no
longer relevant. This distinction could be eliminated by either legislative or judicial action. As this Part will suggest, the best way to ensure the privacy of Internet communications is to enact specific legislation.
Before proceeding, a short introduction to a currently available
judicial—and legislative—independent solution is appropriate. In
the absence of a comprehensive statute, individuals can be proactive
in protecting their Internet communications by adopting encryption
technologies. One popular program that can be used to encrypt e150
mail messages is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).
PGP uses “public key
146

Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 77 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 35 (1986)).
See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
148
See supra Part II.A.
149
United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003).
150
PGP software can be downloaded as freeware for noncommercial use from
www.pgpi.com.
147
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cryptography” to generate two keys: a public key to encrypt data, and
151
The public key, as its name suggests,
a private key for decryption.
may be distributed to anyone with whom an individual corresponds,
152
while the private key is kept secret.
Individuals can then use the
public key to encrypt e-mails that only a recipient with the private key
153
Encryption software is also available for instant messagcan read.
ing, and the creator of PGP recently created a prototype to be used
154
with VoIP.
While it is a somewhat cumbersome solution, a good encryption
155
program is effective against all but the most determined attackers.
Additionally, even the most comprehensive statute can only establish
what conduct is permissible in regard to third party access to Internet
communication; it cannot itself prevent impermissible conduct. Furthermore, as a result of the rapidity with which communication technology is presently advancing, any governing statutes will likely be re156
Encryption is a solution that protects
active rather than proactive.
communication privacy against unscrupulous conduct, whether or
not an existing statute prohibits that conduct.
As noted, however, encryption technologies can be cumbersome
and confusing, and this drawback has prevented their widespread
157
adoption.
The creator of PGP has himself described the program
158
as “not that easy to use” and noted that “[w]e’ll be better off if we
159
develop a system that your mom can use.”
Regardless of whether
such a system is ever developed, Congress and the courts should work
to protect the privacy of Internet communications.
A. Judicial Solution
Both narrow and broad judicial solutions that would protect
160
Internet communications have been proposed.
The narrow solu-

151
PGP Corporation, An Introduction to Cryptography 12 (June 8, 2004) (on file with
author).
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
See Kim Zetter, Privacy Guru Locks Down VoIP, WIRED NEWS, July 26, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,68306,00.html.
155
See Michael Cohn, 7 Myths About Network Security: The Only Way to Keep Data Safe
May Be to Stay One Step Ahead of Hackers, INS. & TECH., June 1, 2005, at 41.
156
See generally Campbell, supra note 10.
157
See Michael Bazeley, Building a Useful Wall: Internet Users Can Reclaim Some Privacy from the Unscrupulous, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 4, 2003, at 6D.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
See Campbell, supra note 10, at 542–47.
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tion consists of “looking to congressional intent to fill in gaps in the
161
wiretapping laws,” so that Internet communications are given an
appropriate level of protection. However, numerous circuit courts
have rejected this approach, making it “unlikely that [this] approach
162
would be uniformly adopted.”
The broad judicial solution would protect communications generally, including Internet communications, and would be based on
existing Constitutional and tort concepts—the Fourth Amendment
163
and the tort of invasion of privacy.
In his dissent in Olmstead v.
164
United States, Justice Brandeis stated:
The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be
let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
165
Fourth Amendment.

Additionally, “[c]ourts have already found liability for wiretapping under the ‘unreasonable intrusion’ rubric of invasion of pri166
vacy.” By drawing on the “unreasonable intrusion” ground and Justice Brandeis’s language, it is suggested that “[i]t would be only a
small step to add Internet-based communications to the protected
167
class of communications.”
B. Legislative Solution
In the United States, no comprehensive law protects privacy
168
rights. Instead, “[p]rivacy rights arise from a patchwork of constitu169
tional rights, common law rights, and federal, state, and local laws.”
161

Id. at 542–43.
Id. at 543. Campbell notes that the “First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuit Courts of Appeal have found areas in which the current wiretapping laws do
not protect communications.” Id. at 538. Additionally, Campbell suggests that perhaps the best scenario would be that a circuit split develops, which the Supreme
Court may resolve “in favor of using congressional intent to fill in the wiretapping
law’s gaps.” Id. at 543.
163
Id.
164
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
165
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
166
Campbell, supra note 10, at 544.
167
Id.
168
Suzanne Ross McDowell, Nonprofits and the Internet: Tax and Other Legal Issues,
21 No. 10 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 21, 34 (2004).
169
Id.
162
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A 1998 Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress described
“American privacy law . . . as sectoral, consisting of a handful of dis170
Some of these statparate statutes directed at specific industries.”
171
utes are specific to Internet privacy, but many are not.
There are
two specific steps that Congress could take to remedy this shortcoming in the law.
First, Congress should eliminate the current storage-transit dichotomy that exists in relation to the transmission of Internet communications. Internet communications should be afforded the same
level of protection regardless of whether they are in transit or in the
type of transient storage associated with the store-and-forward
method of Internet communications. Furthermore, Congress should
amend the Wiretap Act’s definition of “electronic storage” to eliminate any possibility that the definition could be interpreted as applying to electronic communications in the type of transient storage incidental to store-and-forward transmission.
In reaction to the panel decision in Councilman I, Vermont’s
Senator Leahy and New Hampshire’s Senator Sununu introduced the
172
E-Mail Privacy Act of 2005.
This legislation would amend the definition of “intercept” in the Wiretap Act to read: “‘intercept’ means
the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic,
or oral communication contemporaneous with transit, or on an ongoing basis during transit, through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device or process, notwithstanding that the com173
This
munication may simultaneously be in electronic storage.”
proposal is essentially a codification of the holding in Councilman II
and would eliminate both the dichotomous treatment of interceptions of wire and electronic communications and the distinction between electronic communications in transit and those in transient
storage.

170
MARTHA K. LANDESBERG ET AL., PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 62 n.160
(1998). The report also lists a number of federal statutes governing privacy rights in
specific industries. Id. See also Richard D. Marks, Security, Privacy, and Free Expression
in the New World of Broadband Networks, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 501, 503 (1995) (noting that
current federal statutes governing privacy form a “haphazard” pattern) (quoting
Darryl C. Wilson, Viewing Computer Crime: Where Does the Systems Error Really Exist?, 11
COMPUTER/L.J. 265, 265 (1991)).
171
See LANDESBERG ET AL., supra note 170, at n.160.
172
S. 936, 109th Cong. (2005).
173
Id. at § 2. As currently written, the Wiretap Act defines “intercept” as “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. §
2510(4) (2000).
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The Wiretap Act currently defines “electronic storage” as “(A)
any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B)
any storage of such communication by an electronic communication
174
service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.”
The problem with this definition is that, as shown by Councilman II, it
can be interpreted to create an overlap between the Wiretap Act and
175
the Stored Communications Act. That is, a violation of the Wiretap
Act can sometimes occur when a stored electronic communication is
176
intercepted.
And although the court’s reasoning is true to the
Wiretap Act’s purpose, one can credibly argue that it is technically
177
incorrect.
The “temporary, intermediate storage” in the definition of “electronic storage” was intended to describe back-up storage, or storage
that occurs when an electronic communication is undeliverable, not
storage that occurs while a communication is en route from sender to
178
However, Internet communications do indeed undergo
recipient.
“temporary, intermediate storage” during transmission, and the
Councilman I court relied heavily on this phenomenon in concluding
that there could be no violation of the Wiretap Act because the e179
mails were taken from electronic storage.
The definition of “electronic storage” should be changed to
complement the Leahy-Sununu amendment and to reflect the idea
that Internet communications in transit are at no time during transmission in “electronic storage” for purposes of the Wiretap Act.
Drawing on language currently employed, a potential amendment
could read:
(1) “electronic storage” means –
(A) any storage of a wire or electronic communication subsequent to the electronic transmission thereof; and
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of
such communication; but does not include
174

§ 2510(17).
See Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 80–82.
176
See id.
177
See id. at 85–88 (Torruella, J., dissenting). In his dissent, joined by Senior Circuit Judge Cyr, Judge Torruella argued that a strict construction of the term “electronic storage” necessitated a conclusion that Councilman could not have violated
the Wiretap Act. Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting).
178
See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 9, at 1568–69.
179
United States v. Councilman (Councilman I), 373 F.3d 197, 202–04 (1st Cir.
2004).
175
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(C) transient, momentary storage incidental to electronic
communication transmissions employing electronic com180
munications systems.

The above amendment to the definition of “electronic storage,”
combined with enactment of the E-Mail Privacy Act of 2005, will
hopefully ensure Internet communications’ inclusion within the protections of the Wiretap Act when the communications are en route
from sender to recipient.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite the potential privacy threats associated with their use,
Internet communication technologies will continue to be employed
by an ever-increasing number of individuals. Attracted by the technological efficiency, convenience, and potential for cost savings, the majority of people who communicate using the Internet likely do so
without much thought for the privacy of their communications. As is
true with many of the rights we enjoy, most people do not seem to be
181
concerned about their right to privacy until it has been violated.
The decision in Councilman II was undoubtedly a step in the direction toward protecting the privacy of Internet communications. It
was, however, a small step. Limited to its rather unusual and technical facts, the court’s decision is unlikely to have a substantial impact
on Internet communication privacy. Until other courts adopt the
reasoning of Councilman II, any effect the decision does have will be
felt in only a few states in New England.
Unfortunately, there seems to be no panacea to guard against
182
While individuals should
Internet communication privacy threats.
be proactive in protecting the privacy of their online communications
by adopting simple encryption technologies to ensure that communications they wish to be private are so, legislation is the best way to ensure the privacy of Internet communications. Hopefully, Congress
will soon see fit to enact legislation that not only ensures that currently existing rights remain intact, but also will undo the effects of
what many feel have been unduly narrow interpretations of laws cited
by those seeking to protect their privacy.

180
181
182

“Electronic communications system” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (2000).
See, e.g., ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 74–83 (2005).
See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.

